West Virginia Injury Lawyer Blog

Insurance policies are a part of many personal injury cases, and Insurance companies are a common courtroom foe for any West Virginia automobile accident attorney. Because insurance comes into play in so many cases, it is extremely important to accurately evaluate any applicable policy terms at the outset of the case, so that you can know with certainty where the difficulties may lie. The Wolfe Law Firm has helped many clients deal with insurance claims in the past, and our attorneys have found a recent decision that has been handed down by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia that may have great impact on cases involving insurance claims going forward.

In Witt v. Sutton, plaintiff Witt was an employee of the South Charleston Sanitary Board, and was driving a truck owned by his employer while performing his job duties when he was struck from behind by Defendant Sutton. Plaintiff sustained several severe injuries in the accident, and afterwards filed a negligence lawsuit against Sutton. In this suit Plaintiff sought damages from his employer's underinsured motorist insurance carrier and his personal automobile insurance carrier as well because they had denied him coverage for his injuries and allegedly violated West Virginia's Unfair Trade Practices Act in doing so. Plaintiff eventually settled with Sutton and his employer's insurance company, but the claims against his personal automobile insurer remained. The policy Plaintiff purchased from that Defendant included $10,000 worth of no-fault medical payments coverage, and Plaintiff filed a claim on the policy to pay his medical bills for injuries sustained in the accident with Sutton. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant was acting in bad faith by refusing to pay the claim, but Defendant denied payment because the policy excluded coverage for injuries sustained while operating a vehicle owned by his employer. Defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims, which was granted by the lower court as they agreed that the vehicle Plaintiff was driving did not meet the requirements for coverage under the policy. In response, Plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal.

On appeal, the Court analyzed the language of the insurance policy, with the relevant part stating that coverage is available for "a non-owned car," so the question the Court considered was whether the employer's truck constituted a "non-owned car." The policy language did not directly define "non-owned car", but it does specifically state that a car is not a "non-owned car" if it is owned, registered or leased by an employer. The Court then stated that West Virginia law dictates that clear and unambiguous language in an insurance policy is not subject to judicial construction or interpretation, and found the language in the policy to clearly and unambiguously exclude the Plaintiff from coverage. In making its finding, the Court also stated that there was nothing in the record to indicate that any public policy was violated by the language of the insurance policy. Therefore, the Court held that the lower court correctly ruled on the motion for summary judgment and affirmed the dismissal.

In many instances, traffic accidents appear to make for fairly straightforward legal claims when a person suffers injuries in the wreck. A West Virginia traffic accident attorney need only assemble the evidence to determine which driver was at fault in the accident and assign liability, evaluate the damages suffered by his client, and proceed as necessary with the insurance companies involved to get his client compensated. However, there are times when such accidents may have been caused by mechanical failures or other problems with one of the vehicles themselves. In such cases, it is important to evaluate the case in light of possible products liabilities claims in addition to standard claims for driver negligence. When these claims become a part of a case, attorneys must carefully consider the procedural issues that can arise when national corporations are involved as defendants. The Wolfe Law Firm is familiar with the difficulties that develop in such cases, and our attorneys recently uncovered a decision from the US District Court's Southern District of West Virginia regarding the complex jurisdictional issues that can arise in such cases.

Layton v. Ford Motor Company was an action brought by plaintiff, Amanda Kay Layton, after she was involved in a single car accident in Preston County, West Virginia. The accident occurred when the Plaintiff lost control of her 2003 Ford Expedtion and struck a tree. Upon impact, the car's airbags and seatbelts failed to function properly, and she suffered severe physical injuries as a result. After the incident, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in West Virginia state court against Ford Motor Company (the manufacturer of the vehicle in question), several other companies involved with the design and production of parts contained in the SUV, and J&J Ford Sales (the dealership that sold the Expedition). Plaintiff's complaint included claims of negligence and strict products liability against each of the defendants.

In response to the lawsuit, Ford removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and claimed that J&J Ford Sales, which was located in West Virginia until it was dissolved in 2008, was joined in the lawsuit for the "sole purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction." Ford also claimed that because the dealership had been dissolved, it was not properly joined as a defendant. After removal, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case to state court, claiming that the claims against J&J Ford Sales were valid.

The court examined Defendant Ford's claims that Plaintiff had fraudulently joined J&J Ford Sales under the fraudulent joinder doctrine that allows a federal court to ignore the citizenship status of a defendant -- that would otherwise destroy diversity -- to exercise jurisdiction over a case. The Court went on to state that under West Virginia Law, a claim may be brought against a dissolved corporation, and found Ford's argument that such a claim can only be brought to the extent of its undistributed assets to be unpersuasive. Instead, the Court cited case law stating that jurisdiction cannot turn solely on the financial strength of a given defendant, and held that Ford had failed to satisfy the requirements of demonstrating fraudulent joinder. The Court then remanded the case back to the West Virginia Circuit Court from whence it came.

Work-related injuries are a common occurrence, and such cases can present complex fact patterns and legal issues. Because of these complexities and the ever evolving contours of personal injury law, a West Virginia injury attorney must keep abreast of changes in the field. This is why we here at the Wolfe Law Firm are constantly researching the latest decisions on personal injury cases that are rendered by the courts here in West Virginia. Our attorneys found one such case decided earlier this year, and wanted to share it with our readers.

Stevenson v. Independence Coal Company, Inc. is a case that pits a West Virginia coal miner against the operator of a large underground mine in Boone County for injuries he sustained while on the job. In order for workers to get down to the active area of the mine, they must take a rail-mounted vehicle down underground. Plaintiff Stevenson worked as a beltman on the conveyor belt system used to transport material out of the mine that was located in a remote portion of the facility, and was injured when the rail car he was riding in malfunctioned. Before embarking on his journey towards his work site, Plaintiff performed a pre-operation check of the vehicle, and inspected its hydraulic, emergency/parking, and regenerative brakes to ensure that they were in good working order. This inspection revealed no issues with any of the three braking systems, and he disembarked with three other workers as passengers.

Shortly after leaving, the rail car began rattling noticeably, and all four men could smell heat coming from the vehicle. Plaintiff stopped the car, where an inspection revealed some loose bolts holding a service brake assembly mount, so Plaintiff drove the cart onto an adjoining spur of track (to get it off of the main rail track) where he and one of the passengers tightened the bolts, then continued the journey. The car safely made it to the three passengers' workstation, where Plaintiff dropped them off and continued into the mine towards his own workstation. However, the rail car malfunctioned again in the same manner as before, so Plaintiff stopped the vehicle on the main track and radioed dispatch requesting that a mechanic or electrician be sent out to assist him in fixing the cart. Dispatch informed Plaintiff it would be "quite a while" before help would arrive, so Plaintiff performed another check of the cart and found that the same bolts as before were loose again. While attempting to tighten the bolts again, Plaintiff's arm got crushed between the brake assembly and the frame of the cart, causing permanent damage to his arm.

After this injury, Plaintiff sued Defendant Independence Coal under a theory of negligence, claiming that Defendant failed to ensure the cart was maintained in a reasonably safe stated of repair, and that failure caused his injuries. The case proceeded to trial, where a jury found Defendant was 100 percent negligent and awarded Plaintiff almost $2 million in damages. Following trial, Defendant timely moved for a new trial, and renewed prior filed motions requesting judgment as a matter of law. Defendant based these motions on the fact that the causal chain was broken when Plaintiff failed to wait for a mechanic to come help him fix the malfunctioning cart. The circuit court denied Defendant's motions, holding that the questions of negligence and proximate cause were under the purview of the jury, and that the verdict was supported by testimony that Defendant did not have enough qualified personnel on staff to keep the carts functional. Defendant then appealed the circuit court's decision.

The Supreme Court of Appeals analyzed the issue of proximate cause in the case, and reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, as required by West Virginia laws. In doing so, the court found that the carts routinely had brake problems, and that due to a shortage of electricians and mechanics on staff, regular mine workers routinely worked on the brake systems. The court also noted that the circuit court correctly held that the proximate cause question involved disputed material facts and should therefore only be answered by the jury. In so holding, the Court denied the motions for judgment as a matter of law, and affirmed the circuit court's ruling.

Wrongful death lawsuits are very difficult cases for any attorney to prosecute, as they are often more contentious than many other types of litigation due to the high emotional and monetary stakes involved. As a West Virginia wrongful death attorney, it is important to stay as up to date as possible on changes in the law as they happen, and at the Wolfe Law Firm, we pride ourselves on doing so. Our attorneys recently uncovered an interesting wrongful death decision rendered by the US District Court, District of Maryland, and wanted to share it with our readers.

In the Estate of Anderson v. US, Eric Anderson was a passenger in a vehicle that had stopped on the right shoulder of the Baltimore Washington Parkway and turned on its hazard lights due to limited visibility and inclement weather conditions. After the car was stopped, Anderson exited the vehicle, and was struck and killed by a tractor trailer being operated by an employee of United States Postal Service on its way to a mail processing and distribution center. After his death, his siblings filed a wrongful death and survivorship lawsuit for four million dollars in damages against the government, who then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss the action.

Plaintiffs alleged that on the night of the accident, the driver remained in the right lane of the road and did not reduce his speed prior to the impact with Mr. Anderson. In contrast, the driver himself testified that he saw Plaintiff's vehicle on the right shoulder, reduced his speed, and "conducted an avoidance maneuver" by steering into the left lane. The driver hit his brakes upon seeing Mr. Anderson in the roadway, but was unable to avoid him, as he claimed to be traveling at fifty miles per hour at the time. Plaintiffs allege that the big rig was traveling in excess of the posted 55 mile per hour speed limit. Both parties agreed that Mr. Anderson was killed instantly, but Plaintiffs assert that the victim suffered pre-impact trauma before he was struck by the Postal Service truck. Defendant's dispute this claim, citing witness testimony that Mr. Anderson had been drinking heavily that night and a toxicology report showing he had a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.21% (more than twice the legal limit).

In evaluating Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court first addressed whether the government was immune from the tort claims, and determined that because the suit concerned a government employee acting in the scope of his employment, the action was allowed under the waiver of sovereign immunity clause contained within the Federal Tort Claims Act. Next, the Court evaluated whether Plaintiffs could bring a wrongful death claim under Maryland law, as the statute allows recovery for secondary beneficiaries who are related to the deceased by blood or marriage and are substantially dependent upon them. Because there were no primary beneficiaries (spouse, parent, or child), and Plaintiffs were "in no way dependent" upon Mr. Anderson, the Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the wrongful death claim.

Next, the court addressed the claims for the survival action, which are limited to compensation for the pain and suffering of the deceased and funeral expenses. Next, the court stated that damages for pre-impact fright are available where there is "great fear and apprehension of imminent death before the fatal physical impact," but in order for plaintiffs to recover, those damages must be objectively determinable. In this case, the court found that Plaintiffs could only speculate that Mr. Anderson experienced such fears before impact, which did not meet the objectivity standard - therefore the court granted summary judgment as to damages for pre-impact fright, but allowed the claim for funeral expenses to proceed.

Car wrecks are one of the most common events that give rise to personal injury claims, and when a vehicle accident occurs, insurance companies are invariably involved. In such cases, understanding the insurance policy at issue is of the utmost importance, and the language of that policy can have a huge impact on the recovery amount available to the injured persons. We here at the Wolfe Law Firm have handled cases for many victims who have been wounded in automobile, motorcycle, and tractor trailer accidents, so our West Virginia traffic accident attorneys are constantly monitoring changes in the field as new decisions are issued by the courts in this state. We recently discovered a decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia that shows just how important it is to be mindful of the wording and definitions contained within any insurance policy factoring into a case.

Adkins v. Erie Insurance Company is a case that arose from an automobile accident in 2005 that severely injured a young girl under the age of 18. The case began as a declaratory judgment action filed by the victim's parents, who sought the court's ruling as to whether they were entitled to damages that they incurred as a result of their daughter's injuries and the medical costs of helping her recover. Plaintiffs alleged that the woman who caused the accident was insured by defendant Erie Insurance, and the policy she had purchased from defendant provided a $300,000 per accident limit and a $100,000 per-person limit. The victim's case settled for the per-person limit of $100,000, and as a part of that settlement, plaintiffs reserved the right to file a declaratory judgment action against defendant in order to determine whether the defendant would have to pay an additional sum to plaintiffs under a separate per-person policy limit.

At the circuit court, defendants proffered evidence that their policy provided coverage for damages from "bodily injury, meaning physical harm, sickness or disease, including care, loss of services, or resultant death." As a result of this definition, the court found that the plaintiff parents' claims were separate and distinct from their daughter, and that their claims for expenses and medical treatment for their child. That meant that the claims were not subject to the limitation of liability provision restricting payment to the single, per-person limit. Defendant then moved under rule 60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure for the court to vacate the order, contending that they had given the court an incorrect and inapplicable definition of bodily injury. Evidently, Defendant had amended the policy at issue so that damages involved "bodily injury, meaning physical harm, sickness or disease, or resultant death of a person" -- meaning they had removed the language regarding care and loss of services. As a result of this motion, the circuit court reversed its earlier decision, and held that the per-person limit applied, and that her settlement prevented any further recovery under the insurance policy.

Plaintiffs appealed the circuit court's reversal, claiming that the circuit court had abused its discretion by basing its ruling on what amounted to newly discovered evidence. The Appellate Court found that a failure to file documents in an original motion did not convert the evidence in those documents into newly discovered evidence under West Virginia law. However, the Court held in favor of the plaintiffs, because defendants had failed to present the correct version of its own policy, and that could not serve as a basis to relitigate all of the claims in a Rule 60(b) motion. In so holding, the Court reversed the circuit court's decision.